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The Religious Situation in East Asia
Joachim Gentz
To write about the religious situation in East Asia within the context of a book on 
‘secularization and the world religions’ presupposes that the reader understands a 
number of points. I would like to begin by reflecting briefly on these.
East Asia is taken here to mean China, Japan and Korea. China will be 
a key focus of attention because it represents the largest and most influential 
cultural area in East Asia. The term ‘religious’ covers both major global religious 
traditions and specifically national and local religious forms that dominate the 
religious situation of individual regions. Alongside older religious traditions 
such as Daoism, Confucianism and Shintoism, this includes the new religious 
movements.
The opposite of religiosus is saecularis. Secularization presupposes an original 
unity and subsequent separation of religious and non-religious spheres. Otherwise, 
there is no room for this movement from one to the other that constitutes the 
meaning of the term. The concept of secularization highlights the relationship 
between modern European history and the Christian tradition. The separation 
of church and state and the development of a plurality of perspectives and 
worldviews, which ended the state’s monopoly on orthodoxy, and the emergence 
of a civil society, are key components of secularization within the process of 
European modernization. In countries in which religion and the state have 
for centuries had a very different kind of relationship, it is not meaningful to 
speak of a process of secularization. For example, rather than a specific feature 
of modernity, the nationalization of the property of religious institutions, 
characteristic of secularization in Europe in its original sense within the context 
of ecclesiastical law, has been a key element of national religious politics in 
 See Hans-Wolfgang Strätz, ‘Säkularisierung’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and 
Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe – Historisches Lexikon zur politisch 
sozialen Sprache, vol. 5, Stuttgart, 2004, p. 827.
 See Strätz, ‘Säkularisierung’, and Giacomo Marramao’s article ‘Säkularisierung’ in 
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East Asia for more than a thousand years. The coexistence of a number of state-
supported religions, moreover, makes both the separation between religions 
and the state and a plurality of worldviews indigenous elements of East Asian 
tradition. This does not mean that the state itself operated in secular fashion or 
that plurality as a concept was ever subject to reflection in the way characteristic 
of modernity in both Europe and Asia. The fact that, in line with the interna-
tionally established European model, the state in East Asia is justified in secular 
terms in the twenty-first century changes almost nothing about its relationship to 
religions, and the fact that the topic of plurality is contemplated in Asia in the 
European way does not necessarily lead to pluralism and democracy.
A particularly wide variety of new religious movements have developed since 
the late nineteenth century in Japan, but also in Korea. One of a series of new 
religious formations since the Ming period (1368–1644), they were transformed 
in the Republican era (1911–1948), destroyed by the Communist Party of China 
in the 1950s, and have once again become a central feature of the religious 
situation in China since the 1990s. The concept of secularization is as incapable 
of analysing or explaining this wealth of new religious movements in East Asia 
as in Europe. It explains the disappearance of religion from political institutions, 
but it explains neither the continued existence of traditional religious institutions 
within modernity nor the re-emergence of a variety of religious movements in 
Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 8, 
Darmstadt, 1992, pp. 1133–34.
 See Joachim Gentz, ‘Die Drei Lehren (sanjiao) Chinas in Konflikt und Harmonie. 
Figuren und Strategien einer Debatte’, in Edith Franke and Michael Pye (eds.), Religionen 
Nebeneinander: Modelle religiöser Vielfalt in Ost- und Südostasien, Münster, 2006, pp. 17–40.
 See the discussion of this paradigm of continuity in Vincent Goossaert, ‘State and 
Religion in Modern China: Religious Policies and Scholarly Paradigms’, http://www.
mh.sinica.edu.tw/eng/download/abstract/abstract3–4–1.pdf (1 July 2005), pp. 11–13.
 An overview of the extensive research literature is provided by Peter Bernard 
Clarke, Bibliography of Japanese New Religions: with Annotations and an Introduction to Japanese 
New Religions at Home and Abroad, Richmond, Surrey, 1999. On Western scholarship, 
see also H. Byron Earhart, The New Religions of Japan: A Bibliography of Western-Language 
Materials, Tokyo, 1970; and Johannes Laube, Neureligionen: Stand ihrer Erforschung in Japan, 
ein Handbuch, Wiesbaden, 1995, for Japanese materials.
 See Ro Kil-myung, ‘New Religions and Social Change in Modern Korean History’, 
The Review of Korean Studies, 5.1 (2002), pp. 31–62.
 See Barend J. ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History, Leiden, 
Brill, 1992; Hubert Seiwert and Ma Xisha, Popular Religious Movements and Heterodox Sects 
in Chinese History, Leiden, 2003.
 See Zhong Guofa, ‘A Survey of Newly Emerged Religious Sects in the Republican 
Era’, China Study Journal, 13.3 (1998), pp. 22–32.
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modern contexts. Hence, the term ‘secularization’ hinders the development of 
theoretical approaches to explaining modern religion capable of accounting for 
religion as an entirely normal feature of modernity.
It is evident empirically that the influence of religion on modern societies 
has in fact declined markedly worldwide. At present, no one expects religious 
considerations to exercise a decisive influence on technological or political 
developments in modernity. Even in the sphere of private morality, religion no 
longer plays the leading role. Yet this form of empirically verifiable secularization 
is just one of the possible responses of religion to modernity. Religion has 
developed in other ways that point in a very different direction. Religion not only 
plays an important role within modernity as a factor in modernization; modernity 
has also given rise to new forms of religion, which have led to a typically modern 
blossoming of the religious landscape on an entirely unexpected scale. Thus, 
modernity has brought about the withering of certain types of religion or religious 
organization and commitment, but it has generated new ones which have, in 
their own way, displayed tremendous social dynamism. Thomas Luckmann for 
example states, ‘what are usually taken as symptoms of the decline of traditional 
Christianity may be symptoms of a more revolutionary change: the replacement 
of the institutional specialisation of religion by a new social form of religion’. It 
is hard to define these new forms of religion, typical in East Asia even before the 
modern period, with a terminology thoroughly marked by the European division 
into religious and secular.
If we define the decline of traditional religion as does Luckmann and, as 
sociologist Michael Ebertz puts it, work on the assumption of a ‘dispersion of 
the religious’,0 then, to remain with the material metaphor of dispersion, which 
describes the thin spread of a material, the decline of religion would not mean 
a loss of substance. This decline would merely involve a change in the material 
of religion from a compact, institutionally organized form to one identifiable as 
‘traces’ in many places, a form traditionally widespread in East Asia. On this view, 
rather than being destroyed, religion seems dispersed within the everyday world 
by the disintegration of religious institutions. The idea here is that, rather than 
simply ceasing to exist, religious traditions are broken up into countless splinters, 
in which form they continue to have an effect – one that often goes virtually 
unacknowledged. Religious scholars have attempted to capture this new field of 
the formation of the religious, associated with modernity in the case of Europe, 
through a number of new concepts such as ‘civil religion’, the ‘consecration of the 
 See Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society, 
London, Macmillan, 1967, pp. 90–91.
0 See Michael Ebertz, ‘Die Dispersion des Religiösen’, in Hermann Kochanek (ed.), 
Ich habe meine eigene Religion, Zürich, 1999, pp. 210ff., cited in Nüchtern, ibid.
Joas, Secluarization and the Wor242   242 24/03/2009   13:14:40
243
profane’ or ‘sacred secularity’, but so far none of these concepts has really taken 
hold, presumably because they speak to a field of discursive tension still marked 
entirely by a Christian understanding of religion. As Michael Nüchtern states, two 
facts above all make the identification and definition of the religious difficult at 
present: the appearance of quotations from and symbols of classical religion in an 
obviously profane (i.e. non-sacred) context, and the taking over of the functions 
of classical religion by profane spheres of life. This blending of the religious and 
secular in a context in which, to some extent, the religious becomes secular and 
the secular religious, complicates the application of a term like ‘secularization’, 
within this second horizon of dispersed religiosity, to the point of inapplicability. 
Here, the inflation of multicultural religious symbols, meaningful only to ever 
smaller sub-groups, helps bring about a situation in which a phenomenon such as 
individual religiosity is increasingly defined by the obligation either to recognize all 
symbols as of equal value or to opt for one tradition through a profession of faith, 
rejecting all others. In East Asia, this polarization of secularity and fundamentalism 
has not developed only in the modern period; as differing religious traditions have 
come to terms with one another, it constitutes a centuries-old pattern with its 
own discursive tropes and strategies.
East Asian religions have often been studied and analysed through the lens of 
the secularization paradigm. However, as a result of the focus on a secularization 
aggressively imposed from above by the state and its consequences, forms of 
secularization not driven by the state (such as the spontaneous and autonomous 
transformation of temples into schools at the local level) in East Asia have been 
little studied and we know little about them. Even the signs and fragments 
indicative of a new postmodern form of dispersed religiosity have so far been 
investigated only in the context of party political propaganda (see below), but 
not yet in the context of everyday life in East Asian cultures, particularly in 
comparison with traditional forms of dispersed religiosity. In what follows, in 
order to present the religious situation in East Asia in rather more detail, we 
shall be looking individually at the three major national entities of China, Japan 
and Korea, before coming to a comparative conclusion with respect to the issue 
of secularization in East Asia.
 On ‘civil religion’, see the introduction to the dissertation by Thomas Hase, 
Zivilreligion: religionswissenschaftliche Überlegungen zu einem theoretischen Konzept am Beispiel 
der USA, Würzburg, 2001; and Janez Perèiè, Religion und Gemeinwesen: zum Begriff 
der Zivilreligion, Münster, 2004. On the latter two concepts, see Nüchtern, op. cit., 
pp. 24ff.
 See Nüchtern, op. cit., p. 22.
 See Gentz, ‘Die Drei Lehren (sanjiao) Chinas’.
 See Goossaert, ‘State and Religion in Modern China’, pp. 8–11.
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China
The process of European modernization has developed in the form of an histoire 
croisée, that is, a global process characterized by its mutual entanglements and 
the crossing of national boundaries. This has affected China and its religious 
landscape as it has all other modern nations. In the wake of modernization, the 
Chinese empire, which was based on an agrarian economy, a monarchical regime 
and the ideology of Confucianism, was transformed into a modern nation state 
with an industrial economy and republican constitution anchored in communist 
ideology. As such, China now plays an increasingly important role in the global 
economy and in the political sphere. The People’s Republic of China is a centrally 
governed state with a current population of more than 1.3 billion people. About 
a third of them live in cities, some of whose populations are several times that 
of entire European countries (cities such as Beijing, Shanghai or Chongqing for 
example have three times as many inhabitants as Sweden or Switzerland). In 
contemporary China there are five religions recognized by the state: Daoism, 
Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, represented by the seven 
affiliated religious associations; many local forms of Chinese popular religion; 
the religions of the national minorities and finally a new, highly dynamic field 
of new religious movements that has undergone explosive development in China 
since the late 1980s and early 1990s. This tense relationship between established, 
officially recognized religions, popular religious traditions, minority religions and 
new, frequently syncretic and millenarian religious movements has characterized 
China for many hundreds of years.
In China’s case, the assessment of the relationship between modernization 
and secularization depends crucially on whether we classify Confucianism 
as a religion or as agnosticism. The debate on whether Confucianism is a 
religion or not, which began with the rites controversy in the late seventeenth 
century and has raged for hundreds of years, remains unresolved and, because 
it has significant consequences for the evaluation of Chinese cultural history, 
continues to be hotly contested by the representatives of various ideologies. 
That the debaters have such different things to say has to do with the fact 
that Confucianism in China confronts us with something which, in its specific 
mixture of religious practice, religious criticism and religious politics, is not 
compatible with any kind of Western ideology, whose religiosity was always 
 On this concept, see Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, ‘Vergleich, 
Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des 
Transnationalen’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28 (2002), pp. 607–36.
 See Karl-Fritz Daiber, ‘Les associations des cinq religions officiellement reconnues 
en République populaire de Chine’, Social Compass, 51.2 (2004), pp. 255–71.
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defined via the orthodoxy of institutionalized religion. Hence, a term like 
‘secularization’ cannot be applied here with any analytical success. The debate 
on orthodox (zheng: correct) and heretical (xie: crooked) teachings carried on 
in China by Confucian officials for more than 2000 years revolves not around 
the European concern to establish what is true religion or religiosity, but 
essentially around the issue of what constitutes correct state doctrine. Religions 
play a marginal role here. They are of interest in as much as they may create 
something like a broad moral foundation among the people resulting in social 
and political stability. Otherwise, they are considered potentially dangerous 
because, as functions of the social structure, they may disturb order within the 
empire, as numerous incidents in Chinese history verify. Consonant with this, 
the Chinese state’s traditional approach to religions has been characterized by 
policies which merely prescribe formal structures rather than content, which 
control the symbolic level of religious representation rather than the faith of the 
religious and which espouse non-intervention as long as the required ritual forms 
are observed. It is clearly apparent in imperial edicts on religions that these 
were judged and disciplined not in accordance with their content but in response 
to their political impact. This reflects the Confucian attitude towards religion 
as something about which nothing can be said, which one ought to respect but 
from which one should keep one’s distance.0 The regulations thus argue at 
a merely formal level with reference to notions of social and political order. 
Within the religious landscape of China, this combination of state indifference 
to theological content on the one hand and severe restrictions on politically 
engaged religion on the other led to a structure made up of a number of small, 
powerless religious groups that mirrored and reproduced the imperial model 
of order in their social organization, religious notions and practices. State 
 See David Ownby, ‘Imperial Fantasies: The Chinese Communists and Peasant 
Rebellions’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43.1 (2001), pp. 65–91.
 See James Watson, ‘Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T’ien Hou (“Empress 
of Heaven”) Along the South China Coast, 960–1960’, in David Johnson, Andrew 
J. Nathan and Evelyn S. Rawski (eds.), Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, Berkeley, 
1985 (repr. Taipei, 1987), pp. 292–324, here p. 323.
 See Yang Ch’ing-k’un, Religion in Chinese Society, Berkeley, 1961, 1967 (repr. Taipei, 
1991, 1994), edict from 1724, p. 194; Seiwert and Ma, Popular Religious Movements, 
pp. 99–101, 140, 163.
0 See Confucius’ oft-cited statements on the subject in the Analects of Confucius (Lunyu) 
5.12, 6.22, 7.20, 11.11.
 See Barend J. ter Haar, ‘Local Society and the Organization of Cults in Early 
Modern China: A Preliminary Study’, Studies in Central & East Asian Religions, 8 (1995), 
pp. 1–43.
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criticism of religions and steps taken against religions related not to religious 
concepts, but to the violation of prescribed measures. State prohibitions were 
short-lived, religious organizations and institutions were destroyed, refashioned 
and refounded, but traditional policies on religion featured no strict control of 
the faith of particular religions; the doctrinal boundaries between individual 
religions were too nebulous.
This attitude changed as a result of the encounter with the West. Now that 
the concept and the term ‘religion’ had appeared in China for the first time, 
Chinese intellectuals began to reflect on the concept towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. The new constitution of 1912 formulated the concept of 
religious freedom (zongjiao ziyou) on the Western model for the first time. The 
adoption of the Western concept of religion, however, required the adoption of 
the Western distinction between true religion and superstition. As a result, the 
first two decades of the twentieth century saw the wholesale persecution and 
destruction of all traditional religious institutions that did not fit the definitional 
model of Western religion and were therefore branded backward superstition. 
Because traditional religion also mirrored and reproduced dynastic hierarchies 
of order, the destruction of the old imperial political legacy of feudalism and 
the destruction of feudal superstition were often mentioned in one breath. 
Secularization was deployed as an instrument of the restructuring of religiously 
based, traditional power relations; it did not occur as a process of the gradual 
decline of religious faith. In order to comply with the new conception of 
religion and protect themselves from persecution, religious traditions adopted 
the new prevailing political symbolism and rhetoric. From 1912 on, Buddhism, 
Daoism, Islam and Christianity developed as overarching national religious 
institutions on the model of Western churches, separate from the institutions 
of popular religion, which were now viewed as superstition. Daoism, because it 
was traditionally associated with communities of local cults whose practices were 
 On these issues of content and form, see Joachim Gentz, ‘Envisioning Conflicts: 
Aesthetic Representations in Negotiations between State and Religion in China’, 
unpublished talk given on 29 September 2005 at the University of Leiden. This text 
will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book.
 See Goossaert, ‘State and Religion in Modern China’, pp. 2–5.
 See Vincent Goossaert, ‘The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion?’, The 
Journal of Asian Studies, 65.2 (2006), pp. 307–35.
 See Prasenjit Duara, ‘Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The 
Campaigns against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China’, The Journal of 
Asian Studies 50.1 (1991),pp. 67–83, here pp. 75ff.
 See Poon Shuk Wah, ‘Refashioning Festivals in Republican Guangzhou’, Modern 
China, 30.2 (2004), pp. 199–227, here p. 222.
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considered superstitious, was often compelled to defend its status as religion. 
With its ‘atheistic’ philosophy extending over much of Asia, it was much easier 
for Buddhism to portray itself as an international religion compatible with science 
and modernity, with a global orientation and opposed to superstitious notions 
and practices. With the modernization of China, Chinese Buddhism, which had 
formerly been in decline, received fresh impetus and underwent a revival driven 
primarily by the laity. Rather than the secularization of Buddhism, modernization 
led to an international revival. This did not apply to Daoism; on account of its 
local manifestations and cleavage into traditions, it was less easy to slot into the 
programme of modernization in a standardized form. Moreover, it lacked a laity 
actively pursuing its revival.
Because religion had to organize itself into national religious institutions 
in the 1910s in order to gain legitimacy, religious institutions developed an 
officially sanctioned, internal institutional hierarchy for the first time. As a 
consequence of this transformation and redefinition of Buddhism and Daoism, 
Daoist and Buddhist communities that did not fit the modern concept of religion 
and which were linked with local cults, along with their associated temples, 
could be more easily destroyed: they were impossible to integrate into the newly 
formed umbrella organizations and thus no longer had any basis for legitimacy 
as religion. Lacking the new attributes of religion such as their own church-
like institutions, a hierarchically organized priesthood, holy scriptures, etc. (and 
lacking their own military force),0 the local religions had no chance to establish 
themselves in the modern religious sphere and were largely eliminated through 
several waves of anti-religious movements. These movements peaked in 1922 
through the efforts of the ‘Great Federation of Anti- Religionists’, founded 
early the same year, when it was announced that the ‘World Student Christian 
Federation’ would meet in Beijing in April. The proclamations of the Great 
Federation cast scorn on the ‘poison’ of religion and were initially aimed at 
Christians. Though it was Christians that constituted the movement’s primary 
target from 1922 to 1927, on a theoretical level it came to the more general 
conclusion that religion is a product of primitive peoples, that it is based on 
 See Hubert Seiwert, ‘Religious Response to Modernization in Taiwan: The Case of 
I-Kuan-Tao’, Journal of the HK Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Royal Asiatic Society of GB 
and Ireland, HK Branch, 21 (1981), pp. 43–70.
 Vincent Goossaert, ‘The Quanzhen Clergy 1700–1950’, in John Lagerwey (ed.), 
Religion and Chinese Society II: Taoism and Local Religion in Modern China, Paris and Hong 
Kong, 2004, pp. 699–771.
 See Daiber, ‘Les associations des cinq religions officiellement reconnues’.
0 See Ownby, ‘Imperial Fantasies’.
 See Duara, ‘Knowledge and Power’, p. 79–80.
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superstition, is dogmatically intolerant and stands in the way of human progress. 
It was thought to hinder individual development and social improvements and 
was seen as hypocritical. On this view, the origins of morality lie in human 
nature and are not dependent on religion. It was through the arts and sciences 
that the people’s lot would be improved. Meanwhile, following the ‘European 
barbarism’ of the First World War, representatives of the religions took up 
arguments found in European cultural criticism, contrasting the materialistic 
culture of the West with the superior spiritual culture of Asia. China thus 
negotiated a European contradiction existing between, on the one hand, the often 
fundamentalist missionary movements with their critique of a modern society 
considered to be ‘materialistic, atheistic and inhumane’, and the modernizers 
with their ‘scientific’ critique of religion on the other. The theological critique 
of materialistic culture thus became one of the bases of the spiritual model 
of Asian culture, while the scientific critique of religion formed one of the 
foundations of the critique of ‘superstitious’ tradition. Between 1913 and 1929, 
a whole series of new religious laws were enacted, formalizing certain elements 
of the religious practice of the Qing dynasty. These no longer merely provided 
general guidelines, but precise lists detailing the specific features of correct 
religions, lists which formed the basis for determining whether local religions 
should be destroyed or preserved. Religious traditions that lacked these features 
had to redefine themselves in secular terms as tradition, custom, folklore, self-
cultivation or Qigong in order to survive.
But alongside these new religious laws, it was three factors above all that 
destroyed the social bases of many traditional forms of religion:
 1. Festivals and rites, which were bound up with the agricultural 
cycle, lost significance and decreased in number as a consequence of 
industrialization.
 2. The urbanization that accompanied industrialization shattered the social 
and spatial realities characteristic of the villages. Here, community and 
 See Wing-tsit Chan, ‘The Historic Chinese Contribution to Religious Pluralism and 
World Community’, p. 193.
 See Robert N. Bellah, ‘Epilogue: Religion and Progress in Asia’, in: idem (ed.), 
Religion and Progress in Modern Asia, New York, 1965, pp. 168–229, here p. 205.
 Vincent Goossaert, ‘Le destin de la religion chinoise au 20ème siècle’, Social Compass, 
50.4 (2003), pp. 429–40, here p. 435. See also Goossaert, ‘State and Religion in Modern 
China’, referring to Rebecca Allyn Nedostup, ‘Religion, Superstition, and Governing 
Society in Nationalist China’, PhD thesis, Columbia University, 2001, pp. 196–211.
 Poon Shuk Wah shows this in detail with reference to two religious festivals in his 
‘Refashioning Festivals in Republican Guangzhou’.
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religious community were as good as identical, their unity based on the 
village temple. Social communities saw themselves as part of the locality 
and its resident forces and ancestral graves. New social relations developed 
in the city, and these were no longer identical with the neighbourhood 
community. Traditional religious life, which was a part of the community, 
thus lost its social and spatial basis.
 3. Cultural contact with foreign countries led to Westernization. From the 
perspective of modern Western science, traditional Chinese religion was 
superstition. Traditional Chinese culture now no longer represented the 
sole aesthetic arsenal of the Chinese lifestyle, but was joined by Western 
ways of life and values. On this basis, people also turned against traditional 
religion, which was suddenly located within an aesthetic cultural context 
no longer self-evident to young city dwellers. In these times of rapid 
change, traditional rituals appeared bereft of meaning to the youth of 
the cities; ties to the ancestors no longer seemed binding. Rather, on 
the Western model, based on Western urban values, smaller families 
developed, as did a more individual worldview in which the social forms 
of traditional religion no longer had any place.
After the Chinese Communists seized power in 1949, religion was viewed in true 
Marxist style as a reflection of unresolved class contradictions; it would disappear 
when these were resolved. It therefore seemed absurd to fight against religion, 
and people were granted the freedom to follow one; only the five officially 
permitted religions were and are considered to be religions. A statement made 
by Mao Zedong shows that he considered Chinese Marxism the religion of the 
people, and visual propaganda produced by the Communist Party of China 
shows with particular clarity that the party drew very heavily on the traditional 
popular pictorial arsenal of Chinese religion to promote communism. This 
developed into nothing less than an iconographic orthodoxy during the Cultural 
Revolution, one which lays bare how traditional religious functions such as 
the worship of idols, public rituals, sacrifices and martyrdom, redemption, a 
 Donald E. MacInnis, Religion im heutigen China: Politik und Praxis (orig. Religion in 
China Today: Policy and Practice, Maryknoll, NY, Orbis, 1989), German translation edited 
by Roman Malek, Nettetal, Steyler, 1993, p. 26.
 See John Gittings, ‘Excess and Enthusiasm’, in Harriet Evans and Stephanie Donald 
(eds.), Picturing Power in the People’s Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution, 
Lanham, 1999, pp. 27–46, here pp. 30–31; Stefan R. Landsberger, ‘Role Modelling 
in Mainland China during the “Four Modernizations” Era: The Visual Dimension’, in 
Huang Chun-Chieh and Erik Zürcher (eds.), Norms and the State in China, Leiden, 1993, 
pp. 359–76, here pp. 369, 376.
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cosmic world order, morality, exorcism, final judgement and true knowledge 
were transmitted through the medium of visual propaganda.
As a consequence of Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy, launched in 1979, 
Document No. 19 was circulated by the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China in 1982. Here, for the first time, it was accepted that religion 
could survive and grow under socialism. The right to propagate atheism was 
removed from the constitution the same year, replaced by a prohibition on forcing 
anyone to believe or not to believe in something. A few years later, the subject 
of religious studies was reintroduced in the major universities of China. The key 
concern of research on religion was no longer with demonstrating a materialist and 
atheist tradition in China, as had been the case with research on atheism decades 
earlier, but with new questions relating to the possible function of religion in the 
development of a socialist society in China and religious policies reoriented in 
accordance with this. On this view, by means of its ethics, religion should help to 
create good socialist citizens and to produce social stability and unity. Churches and 
temples were reopened, and religious practice was widely tolerated again.0 This 
resonated so profoundly that commentators spoke of a rampant religious fever. At 
the same time, there was a mushrooming of unofficial popular religious traditions 
and unregistered religious institutions across the country, such that the Chinese 
government felt obliged to take serious measures to restrict illegal religions and 
cults. To avoid contradicting its own new religious policies, it pursued a twin 
 See Stephan Feuchtwang, The Imperial Metaphor: Popular Religion in China, London, 
Curzon, 2001, ch. 8; Barend J. ter Haar, ‘China’s Inner Demons: The Political Impact of 
the Demonological Paradigm’, China Information, 11.2–3 (1996), pp. 54–88, here pp. 60, 
79–84; Joseph M. Kitagawa, ‘One of the Many Faces of China: Maoism as a Quasi-
Religion’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 1.2–3 (1974), pp. 125–41; Geremie Barmé, 
Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader, New York, 1996; Joachim Gentz, 
‘The One Discourse that Pervades All: Concurrent Constructions of an Ideal Order in 
the Fight Between the CCP and the Falun Gong’, unpublished talk given in Heidelberg 
on 27 August 2004, to appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book. On the religiosity of 
the modern-day Communist Party in China, see also Anthony C. Yu, State and Religion 
in China: Historical and Textual Perspectives, Chicago, 2005, p. 145.
 See Merle Goldman, ‘Religion in Post-Mao China’, The Annals of the American Academy 
(1986), pp. 146–56, here p. 150.
0 See Monika Gänßbauer, Parteistaat und Protestantische Kirche. Religionspolitik im 
nachmaoistischen China, Frankfurt, 2004, esp. ‘Religionsverständnis im nachmaoistischen 
China’ (pp. 213–45). On the case of Daoism, see Lai Chi-Tim, ‘Daoism in China Today, 
1980– 2002’, The China Quarterly, 174 (2003), pp. 413–27; on the case of Buddhism, see 
Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, ‘The Politics of a Reviving Buddhist Temple: State, 
Association, and Religion in Southeast China’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 65.2 (2006), 
pp. 337–59.
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strategy: on the one hand, it granted the registered religions greater recognition, 
freedom of action and tolerance. On the other, it implemented strict measures 
against unregistered, illegal religious activities. In 1993, Jiang Zemin became the 
first high-ranking politician to speak positively about religion in a socialist society. 
In his famous ‘Three Represents’, he insisted that religion must be practised 
within the framework of clearly defined laws. As a result, the religious laws were 
tightened up markedly in 1994. Shortly after the ‘Three Represents’ had been 
reformulated in an even more diluted form in 1999, a major demonstration was 
held by the Falun Gong movement, in which around 10,000 devotees gathered in 
front of the seat of government in Beijing; this came as a shock to the Chinese 
government. This event changed religious politics in one fell swoop, showing that 
the changes which had occurred in religious policies and legislation in the 1980s 
must be understood as a form of state tolerance of religion rather than religious 
freedom in the modern sense. The new religious movements have been dealt with 
far more harshly since then.
A complex and confusing landscape of new religious movements developed in 
the PRC in the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars are unable to provide a neat empirical 
account of these core groups, let alone all their off-shoots, because most of them 
must remain underground if they wish to survive.
These groupings can in principle be differentiated into those which pick up the 
thread of indigenous Buddhist, Daoist or Qigong traditions and those based chiefly 
on Christian elements. Christian and Chinese elements are however almost always 
combined in varying proportions, and it is possible to discern numerous elements 
of Western esotericism in many of these groups, from psychological elements 
through ufological concepts to European notions of Eastern spirituality. One of 
the key motives for joining such groups is the belief in their healing powers. This 
applies to the Qigong movement and local cults, to the Christian congregations, 
most of which are Pentecostalist in character, and to Falun Gong.
 See Gänßbauer, Parteistaat und Protestantische Kirche, pp. 257–66. See also Tony 
Lambert, ‘The Present Religious Policy of the Chinese Communist Party’, Religion, State 
& Society, 29.2 (2001), pp. 121–29, here pp. 124–125.
 See Kristin Kupfer, ‘“Geheimgesellschaften” in der VR China: Christlich inspirierte, 
spirituell-religiöse Gruppierungen seit 1978’, China Analysis, 8 (2001); Tony Lambert, ‘Modern 
Sects and Cults in China’, China Study Journal, 13.3 (1998), pp. 6–9. See also the following 
article by Lu Yunfeng and Luo Weihong. See also Deng Zhaoming, ‘Recent Millennial 
Movements on Mainland China: Three Cases’, Inter-Religion, 34 (1998), pp. 47–57.
 See Claudia Währisch-Oblau, ‘Healing Prayers and Healing Testimonies in Mainland 
Chinese Churches: An Attempt at Intercultural Understanding’, China Study Journal, 14.2 
(1999), pp. 5–34; Fan Lizhu, ‘The Cult of the Silkworm Mother as a Core of Local 
Community Religion’, The China Quarterly, 174 (2003), pp. 359–72, here pp. 365ff.
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The Chinese government became aware of these groups and their huge 
following at an early stage. The problem, however, was that the government was 
more likely to inspire social unrest than social peace by taking harsh measures 
against so many millions of practitioners. But if the Bureau of Religious Affairs had 
officially included these many groups in a new, expanded definition of religion, the 
number of believers would have grown to such an extent that, in its existing form, 
the Bureau would no longer have been able to deal with them administratively; it 
would have required significant expansion, at considerable cost.
Among the larger groups, 15 have so far been officially designated ‘heretical 
teachings’ (xiejiao) and prohibited. In addition, there are at least five so-called 
harmful groups, all of whose origins lie in the field of Qigong. At least 30 such 
groups, which were founded after 1978 and were active for a number of years, 
are known to have existed. 18 of these groups are still in existence. The years 
between 1983 and 1993 were the golden age of the foundation of new religious 
movements. The tensions of religious politics, along with the typical structure of 
new religious movements, with their loose institutional organization and fixation 
on a charismatic leader, cause these groupings to splinter and be renamed on 
a regular basis. This makes it difficult to determine precisely the origins and 
development of the individual movements. The spread of these groups ranges 
from individual provinces to the national and international levels. It is extremely 
difficult to determine the number of adherents because most of them are 
unregistered and make no official profession of their faith. According to official 
estimates, the total number of adherents of new religious movements in the PRC 
is 1.5 million, while other estimates assume a figure of up to 80 million. This 
would be around 5.3 per cent of the total population. The number of members 
probably lies between a few thousand and a few hundred thousand per group, a 
small number of larger groups extending into the millions. Falun Gong (FLG), 
which used to have 70 million followers, is an exception here.
We know the Falun Gong movement because of the meditators, often clothed 
in yellow garb, or the small groups performing traditional Chinese dances, both 
of which can be seen in the pedestrian areas of Western city centres, their 
activities intended to raise awareness of the repression and torture suffered in 
China by this new Chinese religious movement. It was founded in 1992 as a lay 
movement by Li Hongzhi (born 7 July 1952 or 13 May 1951) and is representative 
of a religious dynamic that developed subsequent to the Qigong fever of the 
1980s in China. Li, the charismatic leader of this movement, sees FLG as a 
path of perfection leading to the highest possible levels of physical and spiritual 
cultivation. This includes a whole series of Qigong exercises as well as a doctrine 
centred on the three concepts of truthfulness (zhen), compassion (shan) and 
 See Kupfer, ‘“Geheimgesellschaften” in der VR China’.
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forbearance (ren). These three concepts are considered to be moral principles and 
at the same time characteristics of the cosmos present in its smallest elements. 
According to the teachings of the FLG, by refraining from every kind of desire 
and all forms of individual wilfulness, one’s spiritual nature becomes cultivated 
to such an extent that, first of all, one attains supernatural powers and one’s body 
is transformed; eventually, one’s individual cells and molecules consist purely of 
cosmic energy. The Falun Law Wheel, which according to Falun Gong doctrine 
is inserted into the abdomen of the practitioner by Li Hongzhi’s transcendental 
Law Body, is helpful here. According to Li, it is a high-energy, intelligent rotating 
body consisting of matter, which has the same properties as the cosmos and thus 
represents a cosmos in miniature. It continuously collects energy from the cosmos 
and, even during sleep, brings about a permanent transformation, automatically 
converting it into cultivating energy.
According to Li Hongzhi’s teachings, the world is morally corrupt, which 
is due in part to the influence of harmful beings from other worlds, which have 
brought modern science to this world in order to make people dependent on them 
and thus subjugate them. Li Hongzhi sees himself as the only one who knows and 
embodies the cosmic principles and who has therefore attained such a high level 
of cultivation that only he is capable of saving the world from ruin, of changing 
it back into a good world.
Li Hongzhi describes his own system as part of the Buddhist school, but 
underlines that Falun Gong has nothing to do with Buddhism as a religion. He 
is also very keen to ensure that no religious terminology is used in translations 
of his works. But the FLG doctrine entails many elements from the religious 
traditions of Chinese Daoism and Buddhism. It bears all the typical hallmarks of 
popular lay religious movements since the Ming era (1368–1644): it has its own 
scriptures, cultivates a sophisticated body discourse concerned with the healing or 
rejuvenation of the body through moral or technical practice, while the adherents 
believe in limitless human potential and supernatural abilities and transformation 
of the body, above all through morality. They also believe in the notion that 
human beings have been cast out from a blissful original state, the aim being to 
return to this state. There is also a belief in a living Buddha who embodies the 
highest truth, and, finally, the associated belief that one may take short cuts to 
redemption through external help such as the Law Wheel, in other words, beliefs 
of a kind associated with the tradition of Mahayana Buddhism. At the same time, 
 See Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun (the complete teachings of Falun Gong), Gloucester, 
MA, Fairwinds, 2001; idem, Das Große Vervollkommnungsgesetz des Falun-Buddha-Gebotes, 
Bad Pyrmont, 1998.
 See David Ownby, ‘A History for Falun Gong: Popular Religion and the Chinese 
State since the Ming Dynasty’, Nova Religio, 6.2 (2003), pp. 223–43.
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modern concepts are integrated into the doctrinal system to a striking degree. 
Alongside Buddhist and Daoist content, the teachings express a worldview which, 
up to and including specific lines of argument, is strongly imbued with pseudo-
scientific and ufological elements of new Western religions in the same vein as 
Erich von Däniken’s ideas. The teachings of FLG thus represent a syncretic blend 
of indigenous traditional religion, modern science, esoteric doctrine and ufology 
quite typical of twentieth-century new religious movements around the world.
In response to the FLG mass demonstration held by around 10,000 adherents 
(of around 60 to 70 million FLG practitioners at the time) on 25 April before the 
seat of government in Beijing, FLG in China was prohibited as a ‘heretical cult’  
on 22 July 1999. The group is accused of causing unrest and social instability, 
spreading superstition and heretical ideas and of deceiving the masses – all of 
them accusations characteristic of Chinese religious politics for centuries, some 
of them using an identical form of words. As a consequence, a new religious law 
was enacted in October 1999, featuring more stringent criteria for the prohibition 
and prosecution of ‘heretical cults’, whose activities could now be punished as 
criminal acts for the first time.
Since the mid-1990s, Li has been living in the USA in an unknown location. 
The FLG movement is defending itself against party propaganda with massive 
counter-propaganda and lays claim to the party’s key spheres of legitimacy such as 
true knowledge, correct morality and correct leadership, using the same tools of 
propaganda as the party, mirroring its approach in perfect symmetry. In contrast 
to the brutal deployment of physical violence against FLG followers on the part 
of the Chinese state, such violence has not yet been used by the FLG.
One consequence of this clash is the enactment of far stricter laws on 
religion since 1999. All the important religious laws of the last six years may 
be related to the FLG. Apart from the latter, however, they are directed at 
all new religious movements, Qigong groups, all of which were removed from 
the official register and therefore lost legitimate status, and the underground 
Christian churches. Furthermore, the global discourse on terrorism subsequent 
to 11 September 2001 serves the Chinese regime as a new, politically correct 
justification for the persecution of religious groups in China, particularly the 
Muslim minorities in the province of Xinjiang.0
 The traditional Chinese term xiejiao refers to illegitimate teachings and is now 
understood as equivalent to the American term ‘heretic cult’, which is also used to 
translate it.
 See Gentz, ‘The One Discourse that Pervades All’.
 See Gänßbauer, ‘Religion (zongjiao) versus üble Kulte (xiejiao)’, ch. 11.3 in Parteistaat 
und Protestantische Kirche, pp. 257–66.
0 See the 115-page report from Human Rights Watch ‘Devastating Blows: Religious 
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Since the early 1950s, the Chinese government has built up an elaborate 
bureaucratic supervisory structure intended to ensure that religion serves political 
objectives, and which essentially continues to exist today. The Bureau of Religious 
Affairs has divisions at every level of the state bureaucracy and is active politically 
at the provincial, municipal, district and county level. Each of the five officially 
recognized religions has a ‘patriotic association’ that regulates the relationship 
between religion and state and sees to it that state directives are implemented 
at the local level and that all relevant information from the association arrives 
at the centre. The structure of these patriotic associations parallels that of the 
Bureau of Religious Affairs.
Essentially, the Bureau’s responsibilities consist in registering, monitoring 
and regulating membership, places of religious gathering and practice, religious 
education, selection of clergy, publication of religious material, financing of 
religious activities, etc. It undertakes annual checks on registration and imposes 
prohibitions and punishments on ‘illegal’ organizations and activities. Registration-
related work is one of the Bureau’s key tasks, representing the Chinese state’s 
most important tool for controlling and monitoring religious organizations, as 
registration requires religious groups to give up their power to reach autonomous 
decisions on their clergy, financial affairs, programmes, religious materials, 
education and more besides; this power passes to the Bureau, which keeps an eye 
on these areas and is involved in decision-making. Services may be monitored; 
in a Christian context, for example, certain topics such as the Second Coming, 
Judgement Day and the biblical creation story may be censored. All baptisms 
must be reported and applied for in triplicate. One form goes to the Bureau of 
Religious Affairs, one to the appropriate Patriotic Association and one to the 
applying parents’ place of work. Legal recognition of a baptism depends on the 
consent of all three entities.
In 1994, the formerly typical legal regulations, which were of a general 
and flexible character, were replaced by a large number of detailed regulations 
governing registration procedures. As the state begins to base its religious policy 
far more strongly on the law, it is evident that we are dealing here with something 
like secularization in the legal sense of the consolidation of a system of justice 
that is secular because it no longer has a purely ideological foundation. Since 
then, the condemnation of religious practice has increasingly been justified with 
reference to specific offences rather than counter-revolution and other ideological 
principles. The law on religion, which has been tightened since 1999, relates to 
Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang’, vol. 17, no. 2 (C), April 2005, http://hrw.org/
english/docs/2005/04/11/china10447.htm.
 See Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: State Control of Religion, New York, 1997.
 See Gänßbauer, Parteistaat und Protestantische Kirche.
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all religious groups classified as illegal; alongside followers of FLG, who have 
faced outright persecution, this applies in particular to the underground Christian 
churches; organizations such as ChinaAid report encroachment by the state on a 
weekly basis in the form of persecution, arrests and torture. In this respect, the 
Internet as a medium of information facilitates an entirely new and in some cases 
shocking transparency, of a kind unthinkable in the past.
Of key importance here is the state’s distinction between the practice of 
religion and criminal activity, on which the state’s understanding of religious 
freedom rests. Consonant with this, the official line is that no one is prosecuted 
or punished on account of his or her faith, but only for engaging in illegal 
activities in the form of criminal offences, which recalls traditional religious 
policies. According to the new laws, all religious activities which are not officially 
registered are considered criminal offences. The interpretation of religious 
activities on the part of the Communist Party generally differs markedly from 
the self-image projected by the religious communities.
Alongside the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security 
and other government departments, three organizations have been established 
specifically to monitor new religious movements:
 1. The Central Leading Group on Dealing with FLG and so-called 610 Office, 
which has overall responsibility for dealing with FLG. The ‘Falun Gong 
Surveillance Team’, established on 10 June 1999 and thus generally known 
by the abbreviated form ‘610 Office’, is the most important response from 
an administrative point of view to the mass demonstration carried out by 
the FLG in April 1999. This institution takes its orders directly from the 
central government; on this basis, it operates autonomously on all political 
and administrative levels, across all administrative, local and juridical 
boundaries.
 2. The Office for Prevention and Handling of Heretical Teachings, which 
coordinates the day-to-day operation of state religious policy.
 3. The China Anti-Cult Association, concerned largely with propaganda and 
research.
 See the in-depth study by David Ownby, ‘Imperial Fantasies’.
 The most detailed account yet of this institution is found in the first volume of the 
inquiry report on the persecution of Falun Gong; see Diaocha baogao ji 1, pp. 18–19, 
42–53. According to the introduction to the first volume (p. 16), the second volume 
will deal exclusively with the government institutions, elaborating in more detail on the 
functioning of the 610 Office. See also the diagram in the version of the Diaocha baogao 
from 15 August 2004 at http://www.upholdjustice.org/NEWS/ZC-all.pdf, p. 6 (16 
August 2004).
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The Minister for Public Security, Zhou Yongkang, described the FLG and 
other ethnic-religious activities as the two greatest threats to the social stability 
of China.
To place these organs of surveillance, conceived by the central government, 
within the context of their pragmatic deployment at the local level, I will refrain 
from examining here the many dreadful arrests and cases of torture regularly 
reported by missionary societies and human rights organizations. While this 
perspective must be taken very seriously, it is nonetheless geared selectively 
towards the activities of these organs, which tell us little about the relationship 
between politics and practice in the religious field, which is, in all, far more 
complex. In what follows, I shall therefore look at the near-daily ritual occurrences 
that are a key characteristic of the popular religion so strong in southeast China 
and which illustrate very well the complexity of the relationship between state 
and religion at the local level. It is hard to fathom these ritual events with the 
criteria typical of European definitions of religion. Southeast China is home 
not to hierarchically organized religious institutions, but to a complex network 
of local temples dedicated to a rich pantheon of local divinities. Rather than a 
hierarchically organized priesthood, there are local leaders who are endowed with 
responsibility for organizing local communal rituals on an alternating basis through 
rotation procedures or divination. Daoist, Buddhist or Confucian ritual specialists 
are employed, mostly from outside the villages, to carry out specific rituals. 
Local spirit mediums are often possessed by the divinities of the village temple, 
perform religious acts and say powerful words during the ritual. But all these 
acts are too diverse and specific to constitute a particular doctrine or to express 
specific religious beliefs. They thus fail to tally with the Communist Party’s official 
concept of religion, which is geared towards definitional criteria such as doctrine, 
literature, organized institution, hierarchical priesthood, rituals which express 
religious beliefs, etc. – criteria, in other words, which were developed in light of 
European religious history and which are of little use in describing Chinese popular 
religion as practised by hundreds of millions of Chinese in southeast China.
According to Kenneth Dean, the popular religion of southern China is better 
described as a ‘syncretistic field’. Most of the thousands of villages have at least 
 Kenneth Dean, Lord of the Three in One: The Spread of a Cult in Southeast China, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. My account also draws on Dean’s Taoist 
Ritual and Popular Cults of Southeast China, Princeton, 1993, and his article ‘Local 
Communal Religion in Contemporary South-east China’, China Quarterly, 174 (2003), 
pp. 338–58. See also his ‘China’s Second Government: Regional Ritual Systems of the 
Putian Plains’, in Shehui, minzu yu wenhua zhanyan guoji yantaohui lunwenji (Collected Papers 
from the International Conference on Social, Ethnic and Cultural Transformation), 
Taipei, 2001, pp. 77–109.
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one temple, often more, dedicated to a community divinity. Since the destruction 
of the Cultural Revolution, many of these temples have been rebuilt over the 
last 20 years. The life of the temples is highly active and is organized by temple 
committees. Events are held there several times a week, ranging from processions 
of gods within the village through processions between villages or to holy sites 
and a variety of rituals, to performances of traditional opera, puppet theatre and 
even films. A procession may involve up to 100 villages and last up to a week. 
In this way, stable local networks are created and continuously strengthened. 
This extremely dense network of local temples sometimes takes on a large 
number of local administrative tasks, thus forming a kind of unofficial second 
level of local government. This restoration of the traditional temple networks in 
southern China can, therefore, also be seen as the continuation of a particular 
kind of politics that has increasingly taken hold over a period of 400–500 years, 
namely the transferral of tasks and duties of the central government to the 
localities, which are organized institutionally through these temple networks 
and thus gain some degree of local autonomy. Here, local autonomy does not 
mean the separation of religion from the state, but the downwards distribution 
of responsibility for local affairs to a local managerial elite, whose institutional 
basis lies in temples, lineage associations and similar local institutions. These 
constitute a dense and well-organized religious infrastructure used concurrently 
for other purposes. But this does not mean that the religious structures are 
straightforwardly secular; we can merely observe that the boundaries of our 
analytical concepts are seemingly not drawn so strictly in practice. It is important 
to how we evaluate these phenomena that the newly emerging temples and 
rituals are not merely a rigid revival of a lost past. Above all, they are arenas in 
which the forces and themes of modernity are actively negotiated. It is precisely 
modern traditions and motifs that are being actively grappled with, integrated 
and adopted in the context of local culture; what we are seeing here is the 
absorption and adoption of technological and political innovations within the 
indigenous cultural symbol system, whether it is portraits of Mao in processions 
or the exchange of CD-ROMs, featuring the latest ritual innovations, between 
the temple committees. The three main actors in this field are the clergy of 
the local temple, national religious associations under the aegis of the state and 
the Bureau of Religious Affairs. Resources and meanings are constantly being 
negotiated between these three key actors. Confrontations between them are 
played out within the institutional framework of the religious laws laid down by 
the state, laws whose specific interpretation is constantly negotiated by all sides 
through mutual discursive exchange. The national religious associations play a 
dual role here: they both supervise and protect the local religious communities 
and have a mediating and translating function between state and local interests. 
It is their task to ensure that the local institutions retain the greatest possible 
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degree of autonomy without infringing the state’s religious laws, while asserting 
their own autonomy as much as possible vis-à-vis both parties.
Hence, these examples at least clearly refute the thesis that modernization 
brings detraditionalization and secularization in its wake. But despite this revival, 
religious life in the People’s Republic of China is very different from that which 
pertained before the ravages of the twentieth century, which have markedly 
diminished the religious sphere as a result of the long period of repression 
and the economic restrictions that accompanied it. However, in those places 
where the local economy is reviving, the reconstruction of the old traditions is 
also proceeding much more rapidly, in Fujian on the southeast coast of China 
for example, which has close ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan, from which it 
receives a great deal of financial aid. But religious life was most damaged by the 
decline of the lineage as the centre of socioeconomic and ritual life. Because the 
clan associations no longer have estates or central financial administrations, they 
are no longer able to keep up their clan rituals on a large scale. The temples 
of the local divinities and associated rites, on the other hand, have been very 
well preserved and reconstructed since 1979. Some were prohibited, others 
were frozen in the form of museums, while others managed, by involving old 
retired party cadres for instance, to grow, thrive and become rich, emerging as 
significant cultural centres in which community events took place, in much the 
same way as sometimes occurs in the parish hall in rural Germany. But apart 
from the waves of anti-religious campaigns, to which smaller local temples have 
repeatedly fallen victim, regulations have been increasingly bureaucratized since 
the 1990s, severely curtailing many temple activities. The Far Eastern Economic 
Review (6 June 1996) reported that in the province of Zhejiang between February 
and June 1996, at least 15,000 unregistered temples, churches and graves were 
destroyed by the police; the city of Ningbo alone lost 3,000 temples. On 12 
December 2000, Agence France Press reported the destruction of 1,200 temples 
in the region of Wenzhou alone, carried out partly with dynamite. A failure to 
register them properly was claimed to be the reason.
On the whole, however, simply because of their own limited means, the state 
institutions in this extremely large and diverse country must still leave plenty of 
gaps in the systems of control and administration. These are then filled by local, 
autonomous forms of collective organization that create their own order, forms 
which are often not only tolerated by the state, but on which it in fact depends. 
This very often entails recourse to pre-modern modalities which express a 
particular way of life, the regional tradition and particular cultural values, which 
 See the detailed case study by Ashiwa and Wank, ‘The Politics of a Reviving 
Buddhist Temple’, which provides a very clear account of the individual camps’ options 
for action.
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flourish anew on the basis of a mutual understanding between representatives 
of local religion and the state. This, though, is possible only to the extent that 
these local forms do not become too powerful and continue to observe the 
official rituals of regular reports and contact with the political centre. The ritual 
events in southeast China constitute temporary autonomous zones, in which local 
communities express themselves and are given form, zones which are constantly 
in motion and of a kind which can only ever exist through such movement. In the 
north of China, local cults develop less in the context of a religious infrastructure 
organized on a large scale than around powerful religious personalities, who then 
bring about the development of individual religious structures  or as places in 
which, in a kind of local public sphere, the power of local elites is articulated 
vis-à-vis or together with the local representatives of state power; these sites link 
various institutions, all of which benefit from the religious activities in various 
ways and therefore support them.
It is of relevance to the present topic that these temple activities have certain 
traits of civil society associations and clearly contradict the thesis that modern 
religion involves a withdrawal into the private sphere.
According to Goossaert, it is possible to identify three basic state measures 
in China relating to religion in the twentieth century, which also shed light on 
our topic of secularization. First, the state replaced the traditional distinction 
between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, which related to the imperial, canonically 
based ethical-cosmological system, with the Western distinction between religion 
and superstition, which involved entirely new criteria and led to the identification 
of five officially recognized religions. Second, the state attempted to reform 
these five religions and to bring their teachings and practices into alignment 
with state ideology. Third, it incorporated some elements of the religions into 
its own secular programme. Thus, secularization appears here mainly as a 
programme of new classifications within a new system of order, within whose 
categories religious traditions had to reinvent themselves as ‘religion’, or, if they 
failed to exhibit the defined characteristics, as ‘sciences’, ‘medicine’, ‘folklore’, 
‘philosophy’, ‘ethics’ or ‘sport’. In this context, then, secularization must also 
be understood as the redefinition of traditional teachings and practices within 
a new conceptual system. Here, the place reserved for ‘religion’ was so greatly 
diminished that the continuity of religious traditions could be ensured only under 
a secular banner.
 See Lizhu, ‘The Cult of the Silkworm Mother’.
 See Adam Yuet Chau, ‘The Politics of Legitimation and the Revival of Popular 
Religion in Shaanbei, North-Central China’, Modern China, 31.2 (2005), pp. 236–78.
 Goossaert, ‘State and Religion in Modern China’, p. 5.
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Japan
Japanese religious history is marked by constant state intervention in religious 
affairs and constant wrangling over authority in religious activities. The role of 
the state has constantly changed, as Kitagawa has convincingly shown.0 In the 
Japanese context, an inquiry into secularization must focus in particular on the 
state functionalization of religion to political ends, which dominated Japanese 
religious politics long before the modern period, beginning in the Meiji era, and 
which has remained one of its key features.
During the Tokugawa shogunate (1615–1868), religions were kept under strict 
surveillance, stricter than was ever possible in China. In order to clamp down on 
the prohibited new Christians, from 1635 all citizens were required to become 
members of Buddhist temples and have themselves registered in Buddhist temple 
registers. The Buddhist temples thus became divisions of the state administration, 
in which births, marriages, adoptions, deaths, changes of residence, occupation 
and other data were recorded. The temples also functioned as schools, in which 
reading and writing as well as Confucian ethics were taught. But while every 
citizen had to become a Buddhist, documents of the period show no evidence 
at all of an increase in the citizens’ interest in Buddhism. Buddhist priests thus 
became state functionaries and bureaucrats, and Buddhism as a religion developed 
little during this period. This integration into the state apparatus initially led to 
a reduction in religious-spiritual activity and thus to secularization. In the Meiji 
period, from 1868 on, this situation changed through the encounter with the 
West and the intense Westernization that set in as a result. Shintoism developed, 
together with the plethora of new religions, as a countermovement to a Buddhism 
perceived as hollowed out. The Meiji regime, led once again by the emperor after 
many hundreds of years, transformed this general antipathy towards Buddhism 
into harsh persecution, which peaked in the 1870s under the slogan ‘Eliminate 
Buddhism’ with temple closures, the expulsion of Buddhist priests and monks 
and the destruction of Buddhist religious objects. Popular discontent and foreign 
protests led to alleviation of the persecution and ultimately to formal freedom of 
religion and the separation of church and state. At the same time, an attempt was 
made to cleanse Shintoism of all Buddhist elements and to transform it into a state 
religion on the Western model, to which end the Meiji government formulated 
new criteria, which often had little in common with local Shinto practice. 
0 See Joseph M. Kitagawa, ‘Some Reflections on Japanese Religion and its Relationship 
to the Imperial System’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 17.2–3 (1990), pp. 129–78.
 See Geynor Sekimoni, ‘Paper Fowl and Wooden Fish: The Separation of Kami and 
Buddha Worship in Haguro Shugendô 1869–1875’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 32.2 
(2005), pp. 197–234.
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The idea of a state Shintoism was abandoned again in 1872, and a Ministry of 
Religion was established which held jurisdiction over Buddhism and Shintoism. 
The personnel of both religions were now urged to spread nationalism and to 
teach religion and morality with an emphasis on loyalty to the ruler and state.
In 1873 Christianity was permitted again, which immediately led to the 
establishment of a large number of Christian organizations. In 1882, the state 
recognized the many newly founded Shinto schools as independent groups in 
their own right and now distinguished officially between sect-Shinto, which was 
financially autonomous, and shrine-Shinto, which received support from the state. 
In 1884, the separation between religion and the state was officially codified. 
The Administrative Bureau for Religious Affairs was dissolved, and from now 
on the state-backed shrine-Shintoism was no longer regarded as a religion but as 
a national cult. It was therefore divested of the authority to carry out funerals, 
which had become a Shinto prerogative during the period of persecution of 
Buddhism. In 1889, a new constitution extended freedom of religion to the 
entire population and banned religious education in public schools. But it allowed 
shrine-Shintoism broad scope for non-religious activities, making patriotism 
into a national cult. Veneration of the emperor and other Shinto divinities, all 
of which were declared national divinities, now became part of the syllabus of 
public schools and the patriotic duty of citizens of all ages. In this way, traditional 
religious politics was now carried on in supposedly modern nationalist-secular 
fashion. From the turn of the century onwards, it is evident that representatives 
of Japanese Buddhism also responded to the Western understanding of religion 
by incorporating the conceptual standards of Christian religion into their own 
self-portrayals, in which experiences of transcendence, for example, now appear 
as a significant feature of Japanese Buddhism for the first time. In the years 
leading up to the Second World War, we can discern a power struggle between 
the state’s efforts to organize and control religions on the Western model, and 
countervailing religious forces, which also asserted their religiosity on a Western 
model; as a result, the state organs of surveillance changed constantly. The state 
tried to use the leaders of individual religious schools to control religion in a 
general sense. It delegated surveillance to the religious groups, which were forced 
to merge to form larger entities in 1941 and 1942, enabling the state to monitor 
them very closely. The 56 Buddhist branches were reduced to 28; Christians, 
Buddhists and sect-Shintoists were forced to take part in shrine worship; religious 
leaders who resisted this were browbeaten, punished and locked up; religious 
groups which resisted were repressed, so that no opposition to speak of could get 
off the ground. Religions were entirely subject to a totalitarian regime.
 See Isomae Jun’ichi, ‘Deconstructing “Japanese Religion”. A Historical Survey, 
Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 32.2 (2005), pp. 235–48, here pp. 238–39.
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In 1945, subsequent to Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, shrine-
Shintoism was abolished as a national cult, the emperor officially revoked his 
divine status, and freedom of religion was proclaimed under a new constitution 
that reduced state control of religion. A Department for Religious Affairs was 
established within the Ministry of Education to monitor this. The original 56 
Buddhist branches separated again, which meant that, together with all the 
splinter groups now approved, a total of 260 Buddhist corporations existed in 
1950; this figure was reduced to 170 by the law on religious corporations of 
1951. This splintering weakened the Buddhist centres financially and politically. 
Social groups that formed around particular shrines were often identical with 
so-called neighbourhood associations (chônaikai), which were state-decreed and 
state-controlled initiatives. A similar intermediate institutional status was enjoyed 
by the so-called corporations of public interests (kôeki hôjin), which enabled the 
state to monitor civil activities since their codification in Article 34 of the Meiji 
civil law of 1896. After 1945, the form of state intervention into civil affairs 
changed, primarily taking the form of very precise bureaucratic regulations. 
Specific laws were made for the administration of all types of corporation, 
including religious ones, but all these corporations are subgroups of these state 
corporations of public interests. These corporations have to report regularly 
to a ministry and may be investigated and prohibited by it. The corporations, 
including the religious variety, must hand over lists of their annual activities, 
assets, membership figures, expenditure, accounts, planned activities, etc., which 
limits their autonomy. Often, an understanding exists that former administrative 
employees from state institutions are to be appointed on a preferential basis, 
so that the groups’ membership also tends to list stateward. Not all religious 
groups, however, have been incorporated into such corporations, or have been 
incorporated only after many years. When the law on religious corporations came 
into effect in 1951, the Religious Affairs Section (Shûmuka) of the Agency for 
Cultural Affairs (Bunkachô), which was tasked with administration of the law, kept 
track of unincorporated religious organizations, and their number was published 
annually in the Yearbook of Religions (Shûkyô nenkan) between 1947 and 1960. 
In this period, the number of unincorporated groups grew from 13,300 in 1947 to 
40,000 in 1960. It is, unfortunately, impossible to determine how many of these 
groups exist today. At 178,603, the number of religious corporations has been 
astonishingly stable since 1951, with a maximum deviation of just 3 per cent.
 See Edward Norbeck, Religion and Society in Modern Japan: Continuity and Change, 
Houston, 1970.
 For an evaluation, see David Reid, ‘Statistics on Religious Organisations in Japan 
1947–1972 (I)’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 2.1 (1975), pp. 45–64 and in the eight 
following issues, up to no. 4.4 (1977).
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Buddhism continues to be the strongest religion in Japan. Because it is also 
regarded as the normative religion on account of its continuity, there are almost 
no studies on contemporary Buddhism in Japan, despite the fact that around half 
of all Japanese take part in the practices of traditional Buddhism. It is hard 
to keep track of Buddhist organizations. They are organized around so many 
different activities within civil society that they are often scarcely identifiable as 
religious groups. Traditional practices are being modernized, and contact is being 
made with Buddhist organizations abroad; some get involved in politics, while 
others play an active role in the provision of social welfare, carry out missionary 
work abroad or attempt to strengthen patriotism. Since the 1880s, a large number 
of Buddhist teaching associations and lay associations have developed. Many new 
groups have been founded over the last 120 years, and time and again great efforts 
have been made to unite these groups with the established Buddhist schools, for 
the big schools are very closely monitored by the Home Ministry, which requires 
them to obtain state agreement for all major projects and all changes. Since 1974, 
however, the Buddhists have established a large number of new organizations 
outside the sphere of state influence, of which the NGO (non-governmental 
organization) network founded in 2002 is undoubtedly the most important. It 
now comprises more than 40 NGOs, of which the largest manages an annual 
budget of around 6.5 million euros, has around 183 employees and branches in 
three countries.
As with traditional Buddhist institutions, it is impossible to provide a precise 
account of the foundation of new Shinto organizations. Up to 1945, Shintoism in 
Japan was divided into three main organizations, out of which the Shinto Shrines 
Association ( Jinja Honchô) developed to unite the Shinto world after the war. So 
far, no Shinto NGOs have emerged. The preservation of a small unit of around 
8,000 Shinto priests under the leadership of the Central Authority of the Shinto 
Shrines Association clearly takes priority over the dissemination of Shintoism 
within society through specific projects.
Alongside the established traditional religions, Japan is famous for its many 
new religions: these were first founded towards the end of the Tokugawa era, 
from the early to the mid-nineteenth century, during the upheavals that led to 
the emergence of modern, industrialized Japan. The Tokugawa government, 
however, prohibited the establishment of new religious groups beyond the 
13 Buddhist schools already approved. After the Meiji restoration, these new 
 See also the introduction by the two editors of the special issue on contemporary 
Buddhism in Japan: Stephen G. Covell and Mark Rowe, ‘Traditional Buddhism in 
Contemporary Japan’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 31.2 (2004), pp. 245–54.
 See the account by Jonathan S. Watts, ‘A Brief Overview of Buddhist NGOs in 
Japan’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 31.2 (2004), pp. 417–28.
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religious movements were permitted to set themselves up as 13 new Shinto 
schools, triggering a second wave of new religions in the form of Shinto sects in 
the early to middle Meiji period, in other words between 1870 and 1890. Some 
of these religions were institutionalizations of nationalist Shinto movements, 
while others were popular religious groups which had formed above all around 
mountain hermits. A third wave began in the 1920s, a period of political 
repression at the hands of a military government. The fourth and largest wave 
followed the removal of state control of religion after 1945. The last wave of the 
so-called ‘new new religions’ runs from the 1970s to the present day. In total, 
we have evidence of the foundation of around 400 new religions in Japan, a 
figure that includes only those religions that made some public impact and whose 
existence has been reported. Approximately twice as many new Christian groups 
have been founded.
The new religions are generally characterized as follows: 1) Their teachings 
place emphasis on ceremonies and revealed holy scriptures. 2) The founders are 
usually charismatic figures promising salvation and often come from unsophis-
ticated, impoverished families. 3) They are mostly syncretic and entail various 
mixtures of Buddhist, Shinto, Christian and shamanistic elements. 4) In terms 
of doctrine and ritual, the new religions are very simple in form. Rarely based 
on innovative ideas, they draw on the religious-historical arsenal characteristic of 
their immediate context with varying emphases. They are very easy to understand 
and thus spread quickly among the population at large. 5) Adherents are promised 
worldly success; material gain is highly valued and is a key component of 
preaching. 6) Physical wellbeing and healing thus play a major role. 7) Most new 
religions are strongly eschatological in character and point to a happy life in the 
near future. 8) Enthusiasm and individualism mark out the new religions from 
their traditional counterparts. 9) Many new religions reject any hierarchy that 
distinguishes between lay people and specialists; most members are involved in 
the performance of holy rites. 10) While maintaining a clear distance from the 
old religions, the new religions are nonetheless emphatically Japanese and make 
reference to old Japanese traditions. 11) The new religions include many popular 
religious elements, magical practices, shamanistic rites and ancestor worship. 12) 
At the same time, modern elements are also incorporated; women, for example, 
play an important role and enjoy a new, equal status.
 See the chapter ‘Characteristics’ in Clark B. Offner and Henry van Straelen, Modern 
Japanese Religions, Leiden, 1963, pp. 28–38, which provides a detailed account of the 
specific characteristics with reference to numerous examples. Ichiro Hori summarizes 
this chapter through a list of eleven points; see Folk Religion in Japan, Chicago, 1968, 
paperback Chicago, 1974, p. 224. See also the eight characteristics identified by Harry 
Thomsen in The New Religions of Japan, Rutland, VT and Tokyo, 1963, 1969, pp. 20–29. 
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From 1921 to 1933, around twice as many new religions were founded as in 
the previous 20 years. There was a pronounced peak in 1940, a decline during the 
war, and another surge after it. After the war, some of the new religions became 
real mass organizations. While some of the groups, which achieved memberships 
of more than one million after 1945, such as the Sôka Gakkai, the Reiyû kai 
Kyôdan or the Risshô Kôseikai, had already been founded before the war, their 
growth had been held in check by state restrictions until 1945; they subsequently 
underwent truly explosive expansion. From 1965 on, we can again discern a clear 
slackening in the new religions’ developmental dynamism. At the same time, the 
post-1945 period saw the substantial development of Christian groups. Alongside 
the Christian churches, the Christian Yearbook for 2004 lists a wide range of 
charitable, evangelical and other groups. Of these, we can identify around 1,000 
different groups that still exist. The developmental dynamic of Christian groups 
differs from that of the new religions. Up to 1900, Christianity showed strong 
development, but in the period between 1900 and 1945 it was regulated and 
restricted by the military government; after 1945 it resumed its vigorous growth. 
The growth rates of Christian organizations are truly remarkable in light of the 
fact that Japanese Christians, who number around one million, make up no 
more than one per cent of the Japanese population. Thus, compared with the 
new religions, some of which have millions of members, these groups are very 
small. According to the figures for temples, shrines, churches and new religions 
listed in the Japanese yearbooks on religion, there are around 180,000 religious 
corporations in post-war Japan.
In all, though, despite the increasing number of new religions, religious 
faith declined by more than half from 1946 to 1950. Between 1970 and 1980 
it diminished further to 30 per cent of the population. The shock incurred by 
the 1994 gas attack on the underground rail system by the Aum sect, in which 
27 people were killed, led to a further decline in religious faith to 20 per cent. 
Nonetheless, during the period when the number of believers stood at around 30 
per cent, the number of those taking part in religious rituals was double that of 
believers, according to national surveys. And even when the numbers of believers 
fell further in the 1970s, there was no discernible decrease in the numbers of 
those taking part in the rituals. In 2005, the number of those visiting temples 
and shrines during the three-day new year festival even climbed somewhat 
(770,000 more than in the previous year) to a total of 89,660,000. It is true, 
He mentions three additional characteristics: they are centred on a place of pilgrimage, 
emphasize the unity of religion and life, and endow their members with a sense of 
importance and dignity.
 See Helen Hardacre, ‘Religion and Civil Society in Contemporary Japan’, Japanese 
Journal of Religious Studies, 31.2 (2004), pp. 389–415, here pp. 400–401.
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as Peter Köpping has shown, that it is above all Japanese tourists who attend 
the village festivals, which have acquired a quite new ‘staged’ character in the 
broken-up village community of today, but this does not straightforwardly 
clarify the relationship between these new productions and the old with respect 
to their religiosity. For to measure the adherents of a religion according to their 
belief rather than their participation in rituals conforms to a typical Christian-
European perspective, which has taken hold in Japan only under the influence of 
Christianity. In this sense, the category of a-religious or non-religious Japanese 
has existed only since the category of religious faith became established within 
internal Japanese discourse. Thus, secularization as measured through Western 
religious statistics is spreading in the shape of a Western religious discourse 
within Japan, and not necessarily in the form of changes in Japanese religious 
practices.0
It is no easy task to determine religious affiliation among the Japanese. It is 
frequently stated that, because of multiple answers, questionnaires indicate that 
far more than 100 per cent of Japanese are affiliated to a religion. There are 
estimates suggesting that around 50 per cent of all Japanese can still be described 
as Buddhists, while other sources state that only 30 per cent of Japanese have any 
religious ties at all, most of them to new religious movements. In a 1976 article 
on secularization in Japan, Jan Swyngedouw proposed that, in light of the many 
coexisting religions in Japan, we should regard the ‘religion of Japanese-ness’ as 
the entity vis-à-vis which something akin to secularization is taking place. Max 
Eger has an even more critical take on application of the theory of secularization 
to Japan. As he sees it, secularization occurred in Japan earlier than in Europe 
and independently of modernity. In sharp contrast to Europe, according to Eger, 
with the host of new religions, modernity in Japan has in fact brought about a 
resacralization of the country.
 See Peter Köpping, ‘Die Umkehrung des Blicks: Zur Akkomodierung von 
Inauthentischem in festlichen Inszenierungen in Japan und Indien’, in Erika Fischer-
Lichte and Isabel Pflug (eds.), Inszenierung von Authentizität, Tübingen, 2000, pp. 1–23.
0 See Satsuki Kawano, Ritual Practice in Modern Japan, Honolulu, 2005, p. 13.
 See Jan Swyngedouw, ‘Secularization in a Japanese Context’, Japanese Journal of 
Religious Studies, 3.4 (1976), pp. 283–306, here pp. 294, 297. On the theory of secular-
ization in Japan, see also idem, ‘Reflections on the Secularization Thesis in the Sociology 
of Religion in Japan’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 6.1–2 (1979), pp. 65–88. 
See also the following article by Tamaru Noriyoshi on pp. 89–114, ‘The Problem of 
Secularization: A Preliminary Analysis”.
 See Max Eger, ‘“Modernization” and “Secularization” in Japan: A Polemical Essay’, 
Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 7.1 (1980), pp. 7–24.
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Korea
As in China and Japan, Korea’s religious history also features two cultural 
encounters that have exercised a lasting effect on the country’s religious landscape: 
the encounter with Buddhism in the fourth century and that with Christianity 
in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Only so-called shamanism, whose 
origins are unknown, can be described as an indigenous Korean religion. 
However, Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity and a new Korean religion, 
Ch’ondogyo (‘doctrine of the heavenly way’), founded in the nineteenth century, 
can be described historically. In different phases of Korean history, different 
religions had a particularly close relationship with the ruling court and were 
promoted and given preferential treatment: Buddhism came to Korea in the 
fourth century and had the status of state religion during the Shilla and Koryo 
kingdoms (from 668 to 1392). Under the Yi dynasty (from 1392 to 1910), 
when it was the turn of Confucianism to function as state religion, Buddhism, 
which had by then become politicized and secularized, was subject to significant 
restrictions. Temples to Confucius were erected, and society was organized 
according to Confucian hierarchies, headed by scholar-officials and soldiers with 
a Confucianist education, with butchers, shamans and Buddhist monks making up 
the lower end of the spectrum. All religious groups stood in a state of powerless 
opposition to state Confucianism. Some of them engaged in political resistance 
and were consequently persecuted to a greater or lesser extent – the former 
applying to the Christian communities founded in the late eighteenth and the 
early nineteenth century.
 See Cho Hung-Youn, Koreanischer Schamanismus: Eine Einführung, Hamburg, 1982. See 
also Kang Wi Jo, ‘Indigenous Tradition of Korean Religions’, Shinhak nondan, 14 (1980), 
pp. 189–219; and Kim Chol-choon, ‘Native Beliefs in Ancient Korea’, Korea Journal, 3.5 
(1963), pp. 4–8.
 See Lewis R. Lancaster, Kikun Suh and Chai-shin Yu (eds.), Buddhism in Koryo: 
A Royal Religion, Berkeley, Center for Korean Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California, 1996.
 See Key P. Yang and Gregory Henderson, ‘An Outline of Korean Confucianism’, 
Journal of Asian Studies, 18 (1958), pp. 81–99, 259–76.
 See Keel Hee-Sung, ‘Buddhism and Political Power in Korean History’, The Journal 
of The International Association of Buddhist Studies, 1 (1978), pp. 9–24. On Buddhist survival 
strategies, see Robert E. Buswell, Jr, ‘Buddhism under Confucian Domination: The 
Synthetic Vision of Sosan Hyujong’, in JaHyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler 
(eds.), Culture and the State in Late Chosôn Korea, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 134–59.
 See Boudewijn Walraven, ‘Popular Religion in a Confucianized Society’, in Haboush 
and Deuchler (eds.), Culture and the State in Late Chosôn Korea, pp. 160–98.
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In 1895 Japan invaded Korea, annexed it fully in 1910 and governed it as a 
colony until 1945. The Confucianist system was abolished, Western teachings 
were introduced and Christian missionaries were allowed to carry out their 
work. As a consequence of the modernization forced upon the country by the 
Japanese invasion, a large number of new religions emerged between 1890 and 
1910 as protest movements against penetration by things Western, whose 
political dominance led to a politicization and secularization of the religious 
field. In opposition to the powerful new Western influences, a new liberation 
movement developed in the second half of the nineteenth century, which initially 
took the name ‘Eastern Teaching’ (Tonghak), thus defining itself as the opposite 
of ‘Western teaching’, which meant Catholicism. This Eastern Teaching united 
Confucian, Buddhist, shamanistic and – despite its xenophobic and anti-Christian 
stance – Christian-humanist elements, making this a typical example of a 
neo-religious national doctrine. In response to the increasing influence of the 
revolutionary Tonghak ideology, the movement’s founder, Choe Che-U (1824–64), 
was executed in 1864 along with 20 of his followers. The movement, however, 
lived on, and formed the underpinnings of a series of peasants’ revolts, of which 
the uprising of 1894 led to full-blown civil war, which was ultimately put down 
with the aid of Japanese troops. In 1906, the movement was re-formed under the 
new name of Ch’ondogyo, again played a key role in the movement opposing the 
Japanese occupation in 1919, but then lost significance before coming to life again 
in the Christian Minjung theology of the 1970s and 1980s. Significantly, both the 
early political leaders of South Korea and their contemporary counterparts, many 
cabinet members, most members of the Liberal Party and around a quarter of 
the present-day National Assembly belong to this Christian community. Hence, 
Christianity has been granted political privileges since the end of the Korean war 
in 1953, in part because it is intended to function as a bulwark against communist 
North Korea.
In parallel to this, the Korean economy underwent a profound transformation 
from the 1960s on, turning from a traditional agrarian economy into an industrial 
one and prompting a major urbanization of society, a society now concentrated 
around a small number of cities. This period saw the emergence of charismatic 
churches with huge numbers of followers, churches bearing the unmistakable 
hallmarks of traditional shamanism.0 At the same time, the Christian churches 
 See Kil-myung, ‘New Religions and Social Change’.
 See Kang Wi Jo, ‘The Secularization of Korean Buddhism under the Japanese 
Colonialism’, Korea Journal, 19.7 (1979), pp. 42–47.
0 See Hong Young-gi, ‘The Background and Characteristics of the Charismatic 
Mega-Churches in Korea’, Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies, 3.1 (2000), pp. 99–118, here 
p. 108.
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increasingly cooperated with European churches, prompting them to oppose the 
authoritarian leadership style of General Park Chung-hee, who came to power as 
a result of a putsch in 1960, and to work towards a democratic, humane, open 
society. It was, therefore, often priests who led the nationwide pro-democracy 
movements. However, church activities and institutions were banned by the 
regime towards the end of the 1960s. In 1972 a constitutional amendment 
effectively abolished the separation of powers and allowed Park to govern as a 
dictator. The Christian groupings responded in a variety of ways, ranging from 
cooperation to vehement opposition, and in line with this, Park dealt with them 
in differing ways, through cooptation, exclusion and persecution. After Park’s 
murder at the hands of the head of the secret service and another putsch, students 
carried out mass demonstrations, culminating in 1980 with a massacre and a 
wave of arrests. The opposition movement that developed out of this united old 
popular religious traditions, Buddhism and Ch’ondogyo into a messianic-political 
movement called Minjung (oppressed, suffering people). The Korean Christians 
took up this idea and created out of it a Minjung theology that brought together 
messianic elements of the Korean religions combined with the Christian theology 
of suffering to make a Koreanized Christian theology; its simplistic radicalism 
helped make it hugely successful as a political opposition, and it played an 
important role in changing Korean society. In 1987, after further student unrest 
on a massive scale, a new constitution was adopted, in which the separation of 
powers was reinstated.
The opposition movement, strongly motivated by Christian impulses, played 
a key role in this transition to democracy, a role which it subsequently lost. 
This plunged the churches into a crisis, amplified by the fact that the economic 
situation had by now improved so much that – even within Christian circles 
– an increased interest in personal advancement pushed interest in religion into 
the background. The religious institutions of Korea responded in very different 
ways. Some Christian groups, with their radical theological vision of a heavenly 
kingdom, remained outside political structures in the fundamentalist opposition, 
while others focused their attention on the bourgeoisie emerging in the new 
Korean democracy, formed parties and got involved in politics and in thousands 
of civil society organizations; these emerged in the 1990s and saw themselves 
as a kind of ‘third power’ between state and capital that wished, as critical 
observers, to open up a public debate on socio-political topics (environment, 
 See Lee Sang Taek, Religion and Social Formation in Korea: Minjung and Millenarianism, 
Berlin, 1996; and Ryu Tongshik, ‘Religion and Socio-Cultural Transformation in Korea 
Today’, Asian Cultural Studies, 12 (1981), pp. 61–72.
 See Park Yong-Shin, ‘Protestant Christianity and its Place in a Changing Korea’, 
Social Compass, 47.4 (2000), pp. 507–24, here pp. 519–20.
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transport policy, industrial law, women, historical guilt, political division) in 
the interests of the common good. The churches too took up these subjects as 
well as building worldwide networks through the World Council of Churches. 
In the Buddhist sphere, a Minjung Buddhism drawing on Minjung theology 
developed in the 1980s in the wake of an intellectual movement inspired by 
liberation theology. This began in the 1960s with the aim of reviving Buddhist 
consciousness, in the sense of Mahayana Bodhisattva compassion, in order 
to alleviate suffering and achieve liberation. On the one hand, this Minjung 
Buddhism opposed the two great conservative movements of the patriotic 
communities (of monks and lay people), which, with their nationalist demands, it 
accused of wishing only to retain power and estates and thus of pursuing a purely 
secular agenda. On the other hand, it opposed the fusion of popular Buddhist 
practices of Amitabha veneration and traditional shamanistic rites, practised 
mainly by women, which supposedly ensured a long life and worldly wellbeing. 
Again, it objected to these practices on the grounds that they were concerned 
solely with secular goals. Thus, in twentieth-century Korea, Buddhism too 
incorporated the impulse against secularization that formed the basis for the 
development of new religious movements.
In much the same way as in Japan, with respect to society and politics as 
well as in their relations with each other, religions in Korea occupy a field of 
tension involving very different endeavours. First, they advocate traditional-
conservative stances, on the basis of which they often attempt to serve politics 
in a nationalistic fashion. Second, they involve themselves in the political 
opposition which, in sharp contrast, conceives of religion as fundamentally 
opposed to politics. Furthermore, religious groups engage in civil society in 
an active attempt to introduce their religious ideals to society. Finally, new 
religions emerge. Within the unlimited field of global multicultural impulses, 
these religions attempt to forge new, coherent religious identities from the rubble 
of their own fragmented tradition.
Practically nothing is known about the religious situation in the north of 
Korea. According to the Christian missionaries best informed about it, there is 
theoretical freedom of religion but, in the shape of the ephemeral state-controlled 
 See Christine Lienemann-Perrin, ‘Religion und staatliche Macht in Korea: Eine 
Skizze mit Beispielen aus Geschichte und Gegenwart’, in Peter Schalk (ed.), Zwischen 
Säkularismus und Hierokratie: Studien zum Verhältnis von Religion und Staat in Süd- und Ostasien, 
Uppsala, 2001, pp. 143–67, here p. 163.
 See Shim Jae-ryong, ‘Buddhism and the Modernization Process in Korea’, Social 
Compass 47.4 (2000), pp. 541– 48, here pp. 542–43. See also Henrik H. Sorensen, 
‘Buddhism and Secular Power in Twentieth-Century Korea’, in Ian Harris (ed.), Buddhism 
and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia, London, 1999, pp. 127–52.
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North Korean Christians’ Association, all that exists in reality is an ersatz church 
with three churches in Pyongyang, to which only carefully selected members are 
sent. As in China, the religious communities are organized in state-controlled 
organs. Since 1946, Protestants have been brought together in the Korean 
Christian Federation (KCF), Catholics, since 1988, in the Korean Catholic 
Federation, and other members of religious groups, since 1989, in the Korean 
Religionists’ Council. According to estimates, around 10,000–12,000 of the 24 
million North Koreans are Christians, compared with up to 18 million out of 44 
million in South Korea, that is, rather more than 40 per cent. According to official 
figures, there are 10,000 Buddhists in North Korea, and there is universal religious 
freedom. However, as the communist ideology of North Korea is atheistic, despite 
the god-like status of its political leader and the quasi-religious personality cult 
that surrounds him, we must assume that religions are strictly controlled and 
probably subject to extensive repression, even after the 1992 removal of the clause 
in the constitution explicitly prohibiting religious activities.
Following this rough sketch, I shall conclude by drawing some conclusions 
about secularization in East Asia.
Conclusion
Taken together, East Asian religions appear Janus-faced: the servants and allies of 
the state on the one hand and its opponents and enemies on the other. In all three 
countries, a limited number of specific religious traditions have been permitted 
by the state; these have been used to further the state’s secular goals and have, at 
different times, been favoured or repressed. In this connection, it is possible to 
discern the secularization of religious traditions in East Asia long before the dawn 
of the modern age. Further, all three countries – and here their traditions differ 
from the Christian traditions of Europe – have absorbed and integrated several 
foreign religions over the course of the last two thousand years. Consonant with 
this, through the encounter with Europe, all three have developed numerous 
new religious movements that closely resemble one another in their basic features 
(syncretism, charismatic leaders, simple dogma, millenarian focus on salvation, 
etc.). As a result, in all three countries the old religious traditions have also 
changed greatly and, in light of the Christian-Western concept of religion, have 
often renewed themselves behind the shield of secular concepts, which suggests 
continuities with East Asian forms of religion and Western processes of secular-
ization. Finally, very much in keeping with contemporary global developments, all 
three currently feature an extremely wide range of religious diversity and their 
religions currently enjoy broad appeal.
The question of whether secularization has occurred in the individual East 
Asian countries always demands a dual answer, one positive, the other negative.
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With respect to China, we might answer, positively, as follows:
Yes, since 1911 there has been no Son of Heaven, his rule legitimized 
by a heavenly mandate; the state has a secular foundation and there is 
a strict legal separation between religion and the state.
Yes, the everyday religious routine has been lost in most parts of the 
country. Most people do not regularly take part in religious activities. 
It is the exception rather than the norm to be religious in China; 
religion has suffered a marked loss of significance.
Yes, the concept of religion has been introduced and with it the 
critique of religion. As a rule, the world is explained without recourse 
to gods and spirits. Practically no religious socialization occurs, while 
perspectives critical of religion are promoted. Thus, religion does not 
constitute a fundamental system of reference; across most of China, 
it is a private matter.
Yes, over the last hundred years, throughout the country, religious 
institutions have suffered acts of destruction – long since irreversible 
– on a massive scale. Certainly, temples have been reconstructed and 
ordinations performed, but even tens of thousands of temples with 
hundreds of thousands of clergy are a mere drop in the ocean in 
this context, and religious institutions have thus declined markedly 
as well.
Yes, in those places where religion has a secure place, this is entirely 
due to the understanding that it relieves the state of order-maintaining 
functions at the local level, making it akin to a secular and civil 
society-based institution. The five officially recognized religions act in 
conformity with the secular expectations that the state has of them. 
They stand outside social life, as institutions endowed with a religious 
character that exist within a secular context.
One might counter:
No, the Communist Party certainly promotes the idea that it is 
atheistic, but has always made use of religious concepts and images 
in cultivating its image. Besides, it makes theological decisions on 
orthodoxy and heresy, on true religion and superstition. Thus, religion 
and the state are not truly separate.
No, while the everyday religious routine has vanished for the time 
being as a result of temporary political repression, in those places 
where it is developing most strongly at present, in the southeast of 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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China, it is already playing an important role in public life, and is thus 
by no means slipping away into the private sphere.
No, there are countless local cults, hundreds of new religious 
movements and the major religious traditions are growing year on 
year. Temples are being built everywhere, while monks and nuns are 
being ordained in their thousands. With increasing economic growth, 
the country will again be dotted with countless temples, and an intact 
religious landscape will again take shape over the long term.
No, in some fields the religious infrastructure is so vital to local life 
and local politics and administration that it is impossible to separate 
the religious from the secular. The fact that the state has begun to 
transfer state functions even to the official religions over the last 
decade shows that they too have a solid political basis. Thus, religion 
will become increasingly important, and without it, it will no longer 
be possible to maintain the sociopolitical order at the local level.
With respect to Japan, we can answer positively as follows:
Yes, on 1 January 1946 the Tenno officially renounced his divine 
status; the constitution states explicitly that religion and the state are 
separate.
Yes, the concept of religion has been introduced and with it the 
critique of religion. As a rule, the world is explained without recourse 
to gods and spirits.
Yes, the number of believers has declined markedly, by more than half 
from 1946 to 1950, down to 30 per cent between 1970 and 1980 and 
to 20 per cent following the gas attack on Tokyo’s underground rail 
system by the Aum sect in 1994.
Yes, the Buddhist temples increasingly offer rituals with a worldly 
orientation (concerned with prosperity, security, etc.) that no longer 
have anything to do with their old religious-spiritual meanings.
Yes, Shintoism has been emptied entirely of its religious content and 
has been secularized into nothing more than a state cult.
Yes, the many new religious movements are an expression of the 
fact that religion has disintegrated into discrete, highly individualized 
spheres, that primarily pursue secular goals.
Yes, the institutionalized religions are all heavily involved in civil 
society; they too primarily pursue secular goals.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Yes, the village communities have suffered such shattering 
transformation that more tourists than villagers now attend rural 
religious festivals.
On the other hand:
No, Japan is full of temples and shrines. Both in the cities and in the 
countryside there are religious establishments on every corner that are 
actively maintained and have a full roster of events.
No, public rituals are a common occurrence in which many people, 
increasing numbers in fact, participate. The everyday religious routine 
is largely intact; regular participation in religious events is a cultural 
norm and defines Japanese religiosity far more profoundly than 
religious faith.
No, the new religious movements are so numerous and active that 
religion continues to be a key topic for many different social classes, 
giving it an important role in public discourse. Religion is not, 
therefore, a purely private, personal affair.
With respect to Korea, the positive answers are:
Yes, the constitution codifies the separation of state and religion.
Yes, the concept of religion has been introduced and with it the 
critique of religion. As a rule, the world is explained without recourse 
to gods and spirits.
Yes, in the face of the overriding interest in economic development in 
Korea, religions are either meaningless or involve themselves in the 
pursuit of worldly salvation and in political and civil society-related 
affairs.
On the other hand:
No, there is no indication that the religions are declining or losing 
importance. They are growing steadily and are a lively presence in 
public and social life.
No, creative religious work is being done and there is clear evidence 
of internal religious debates; both lead to religious innovation.
No, religious education is a widespread phenomenon, and active 
missionary work is being carried out all over the world. Religion 
continues to make a significant impact.
These answers reveal that the concept of secularization, with its associated 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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criteria, can help us see certain realities more clearly. At the same time it is 
apparent that, rather than describing fully the contemporary religious situation 
in East Asia, it can only reveal various aspects. Depending on the criteria we 
select, we can describe these as secular or not; they exist within a process of 
lively, mutual negotiation. It appears to be the specific fusion of these different 
aspects, a fusion subject to a process of constant transformation, that ultimately 
distinguishes these religious cultures from one another.
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